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SUMMARY 
 
The right to legal representation at labour proceedings of an administrative or 
quasi-judicial nature is not clear in our law, and has been the subject of 
contradictory debate in the South African courts since the1920’s.  
 
Despite the ambiguities and uncertainty in the South African common law, the 
statutory regulation of legal representation was not comprehensively captured in 
labour legislation resulting in even more debate, especially as to the right to be 
represented by a person of choice at these proceedings in terms of the relevant 
entrenched protections contained in the Bill of Rights. 
 
The Labour Relations Act 12 of 2002 (prior to amendment) is silent on the right to 
representation at in-house disciplinary proceedings. Section 135(4) of Act 12 of 
2002 allows for a party at conciliation proceedings to appear in person or to be 
represented by a director or co employee or a member or office bearer or official 
of that party’s registered trade union. Section 138(4) of the same Act allows for 
legal representation at arbitration proceedings, but subject to section 140(1) 
which excludes legal representation involving dismissals for reasons related to 
conduct or capacity, unless all parties and the commissioner consent, or if the 
commissioner allows it per guided discretion to achieve or promote 
reasonableness and fairness. 
 
The abovementioned three sections were however repealed by the amendments 
of the Labour Relations Act 12 of 2002. Despite the repealing provision, Item 27 
of Schedule 7 of the Amendment reads that the repealed provisions should 
remain in force pending promulgation of specific rules in terms of section 
115(2A)(m) by the CCMA. These rules have not been promulgated to date. 
 
The common law’s view on legal representation as a compulsory consideration in 
terms of section 39 of the Constitution 108 of 1996 and further a guidance to the 
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entitlement to legal representation where legislation is silent. The common law 
seems to be clear that there is no general right to legal representation at 
administrative and quasi judicial proceedings. If the contractual relationship is 
silent on representation it may be permitted if exceptional circumstances exist, 
vouching such inclusion. Such circumstances may include the complex nature of 
the issues in dispute and the seriousness of the imposable penalty ( for example 
dismissal or criminal sanction). Some authority ruled that the principles of natural 
justice supercede a contractual condition to the contrary which may exist 
between employer and employee. The courts did however emphasize the 
importance and weight of the contractual relationship between the parties in 
governing the extent of representation at these proceedings.                     
 
Since 1994 the entrenched Bill of Rights added another dimension to the 
interpretation of rights as the supreme law of the country. On the topic of legal 
representation and within the ambit of the limitation clause, three constitutionally 
entrenched rights had to be considered. The first is the right to a fair trial, 
including the right to be represented by a practitioner of your choice. Authority 
reached consensus that this right, contained in section 35 of the Constitution Act 
108 of 1996 is restricted to accused persons charged in a criminal trial. The 
second protection is the entitlement to administrative procedure which is 
justifiable and fair (This extent of this right is governed y the provisions of the 
Promotion of Access to Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000) and thirdly the right 
to equality before the law and equal protection by the law. 
 
In conclusion, the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 upholds the law of general 
application, if free and justifiable. Within this context, the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 allows for specific representation at selected fora, and the common law 
governs legal representation post 1994 within the framework of the Constitution.  
 
The ultimate test in considering the entitlement to legal representation at 
administrative and quasi judicial proceedings will be in balancing the protection of 
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the principle that these tribunals are masters of their own procedure, and that 
they may unilaterally dictate the inclusion or exclusion of representation at these 
proceedings and the extent of same, as well as the view of over judicialation of 
process by the technical and delaying tactics of legal practitioners, against the 
wide protections of natural justice and entrenched constitutional protections.                  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A right to legal representation is today, generally regarded as a necessity, and 
not as a privilege. This point was emphasized by the Hoexter Commission of 
Enquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts 1. Within the South 
African Constitutional framework, the right to legal representation flows from two 
principles: that an accused person is entitled to a fair trial, and that of equality 
before the law, as well as the application of these principles to the judicial 
process.  
            
As early as 1920, the Appellate Division of the High Court of South Africa in the 
case of Dabner v SA Railways and Harbours established the principle that there 
was no common law authority for the proposition that a party had a right to legal 
representation before tribunals other than courts of law. 
 
Having regard to the sometimes severe consequences which a finding of guilty 
can have on the lives of the alleged perpetrator and his or her dependants, the 
following view of Lord Denning over the exercise of discretion in Enderby Town 
Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd2 is still defensible and does it 
reflect those values which form part of a human rights culture: 
 
Is a party who is charged before a domestic tribunal entitled as to be 
legally represented? Much depends on what the rules say about it. When 
the rules say nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally 
represented. It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. They are 
masters of their own procedure, and if they, in the proper exercise of their 
discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the Courts will not 
interfere. 
 
Is legal representation only a question of the proper exercise of discretion within 
the broader context of being “masters of their own procedure”?  
                                                
1 RP 78/1983 volume 1 part II par 6.4.1. 
2 1971(1) All ER 215. 
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Within the labour law context, the entitlement to, interpretation and extent of the 
right to representation is expressed in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, and 
reconsidered in the Labour Relations Amendment Act 12 of 2002. 
   
Fundamental rights, including inter alia the right to be legally represented, the 
right to equality and to equal protection by the law, as well as to the right to fair 
administrative action have, within the South African context, for the first time 
been specifically entrenched in the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, and 
thereafter in the final Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 (“The Constitution”). The 
statutory recognition and protection of these rights need therefore to be analysed 
and interpreted in terms of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution and of 
the common law, to establish it’s impact on the employer and the employee’s 
right to legal representation at internal disciplinary enquiries and at defined 
proceedings before the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
(hereinafter referred to as the CCMA). 
 
2 THE STATUTORY POSITION 
2.1 LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 of 1995  
 
The question of representation at in-house disciplinary proceedings and activities 
before the CCMA is a vexed an controversial one, involving disputes as to who is 
or who is not a labour consultant, a trade union official, an employer’s 
organization official, or a legal representative, and their respective right of 
appearance before the commission and/or proceedings. Certain of these 
categories of persons has been defined, including their legal statutory status 
regarding representation, and will be discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
Emphasis needs, however, to be focused on the application and enforcement of 
internal as well as quasi-judicial policy in reviewing the approach to 
representation at specific proceedings. 
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The issue of legal representation at labour adjudications, conciliations and 
arbitrations has similarly been a matter of some controversy, which has already 
been exhaustively debated 3. The following points have been extracted from the 
various arguments on the topic: 
 
· The CCMA is not a court of law, but an administrative tribunal4. 
· A party to proceedings before an administrative tribunal would not 
under common law be entitled to legal representation as of right5. 
Accordingly, the statutory granting of the right to legal representation 
before an administrative tribunal may be regarded as an alteration of 
the common law and therefore be restrictively interpreted. 
· The CCMA is not an ordinary administrative tribunal as a 
commissioner acting as an arbitrator is empowered by section 142 of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 to subpoena witnesses, including 
a witness duces tecum, administer an oath or accept an affirmation, 
and, after obtaining the necessary authorization from a judge of the 
labour court, can enter and search any premises for the purposes of 
seizing any book, document or object on those premises or taking a 
statement from any person on those premises who is willing to give 
such  a statement. 
· The granting of an unqualified right of appearance to legal practitioners 
would ostensibly favour the employer at the expense of the employee, 
certainly where the employer was not a “small employer” and the 
employee was not represented by a trade union. 
· Unlike the industrial court, the commissioner acting as arbitrator is 
empowered, or at least has the discretion, to level the playing fields by 
adopting a more inquisitorial or interventionist role in order to ensure 
that all relevant facts are placed before the commission at the 
                                                
3 PJ Pretorius, Legal Representation in the Industrial Court (1986) 7 ILJ 18, P Benjamin, Legal 
Representation in Labour Courts (1994) 15 ILJ 250, P Buirski, The Draft Labour Relations Bill 1995 - The 
Case for Legal Representation as its Proposed For a for Dispute Resolution (1995) 16 ILJ 529.  
4 SA Technical Officials in Association v President of the Industrial Court and Others (1985) 6 ILJ 186 (A) 
5 Dabner v SA Railways and Harbours 1920 AD 583. 
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arbitration. However, the levels of acceptability of such interventions 
are somewhat unclear.  
 
The ministerial task team presented the following approach to legal 
representation in the explanatory memorandum to the Draft of the Labour 
Relations Act6: 
 
Legal representation is not permitted during arbitration (concerned with 
dismissals for misconduct and incapacity) except with the consent of the 
parties. Lawyers make the process legalistic and expensive. They are also 
often responsible for delaying the proceedings due to their unavailability 
and the approach they adopt. Allowing legal representation places 
individual employees and small business at a disadvantage because of 
the cost.     
 
The task team’s justification for denying legal representation rests on the validity 
of the premise that “lawyers make the process legalistic, expensive and are 
responsible for delays”. The merits of these assertions are not fully canvassed in 
the explanatory memorandum, which is unfortunate given the importance of the 
prohibition. Although not expressly acknowledged, the task team appears to have 
derived some of its ideas in this regard from an article by Paul Benjamin, “Legal 
Representation in Labour Courts”7. Benjamin argues inter alia that legal 
representation results in the process becoming legalistic, expensive and slow. He 
concludes by stating that participation by lawyers may lead to disputes becoming 
more formal, time consuming and expensive and quotes a comparative labour 
lawyer, Benjamin Aaron, as stating in regard to labour arbitration disputes in the 
United States of America that the involvement of lawyers “has tended to make 
the proceedings more formal, and has also increased both the expense or 
arbitration and the likelihood of delays”. Whether these conclusions are equally 
valid in South Africa is, however, nor really explored by Benjamin. 
 
                                                
6 Act 66 of 1995. 
7 (1994) 15 ILJ 250. 
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Benjamin’s principal criticism of legal representation appears to be that it has 
resulted in unequal access to representation, with employers gaining an unfair 
advantage over employees.  
 
As a counter argument to the abovementioned criticism by Benjamin, Geoffrey 
Fick stated the following in Natural Justice, Principles and Practical Application8: 
 
The advantages of having a representative trained in law are too 
frequently ignored and consequently deserve recollection. Council can, 
inter alia, act as a deterrent to the summary dismissal of a party’s case; 
bridge possibilities between the party and tribunal members; clear up 
vagaries and inconsistencies in testimony; and can focus attention of 
tribunal members on elements of a party’s claim. Moreover it is fair to 
observe that a lawyer has a rather unique ability to interpret relevant 
statutory provisions and to ensure consistency in administrative decision 
making by marshalling whatever prior decisions of the tribunal or the 
courts serve as a guide to the exercise of administrative discretions. The 
ability of a lawyer to delineate what may otherwise be a complex legal and 
factual issue and his role in acting as a check upon the administrative 
process should never be underestimated. 
      
Section 185 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”) determines that 
every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. The right is 
underpinned by section 23(1) of the Constitution, which proclaims that everyone 
has the right to fair labour practice, and therefore not to be unfairly dismissed. 
The section does not limit or define the parameters of the protection, but is 
seems sufficient to point out that the issue is whether the provision in question 
purports exhaustively to prescribe the employee’s protection against unfair 
dismissal in our law. If in the affirmative, it will be unconstitutional unless it can be 
rescued under the limitation clause entrenched in section 36 of the Constitution, 
which permits derogations from fundamental rights if they would be reasonable 
and justifiable in an free, open and democratic society, based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom and considering the nature of the right, the importance of 
                                                
8 Second edition 1984 Butterworths Sydney.   
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the object of the limitation, the extent of the limitation, and the relationship 
between the limitation and its’ purpose. 
        
In the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, Section C to the LRA 9, a dismissal is 
labeled unfair if it is not effected for a fair reason and not in accordance with a 
fair procedure, even if it complies with any notice period in a contract of 
employment or in legislation governing employment.  
 
In section 5 of the LRA, it is stipulated that no person may discriminate against 
an employee for exercising any right conferred by this Act.           
 
Section 3 of the Code of Good Practice10 of the LRA explains the disciplinary 
measures short of dismissal, and elaborates in paragraph 4 of this section on the 
general prerequisites to dismissal as appropriate sanction. The Code refers to 
the seriousness and gravity of the misconduct, as well as some examples of 
same.  
 
In section 4 of the Code11, the procedural aspects of a disciplinary hearing is 
outlined, and includes inter alia the employee’s right to be assisted by a trade 
union representative or a fellow employee. 
 
Section 188A of the LRA further allows for an employer, with the consent of the 
employee, to request a council, an accredited agency or the Commission12 to 
conduct an arbitration into allegations about the conduc t or capacity of that 
employee. In subsection 5 the right to representation is addressed in allowing the 
employee to be represented by: 
· A co-employee; 
· A director or employee; or 
                                                
9 Schedule 8 of section C of the LRA. 
10 Note 9 supra. 
11 Note 9 supra. 
12 Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration. 
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· A union representative  
 
The representation of employees at the CCMA is further dealt with in sections 
135(4), 138(4) and 140(1) of the LRA. 
 
Section 135(4) allows for a party at conciliation proceedings to appear in person, 
or to be represented only by a director or employee of that party, or a member, 
office bearer or official of that party’s registered trade union or registered 
employer’s organization. The commissioner has no discretion to permit 
representation wider than the wording of this section for conciliation proceedings.        
 
In terms of section 138(4) of the LRA a legal practitioners has a right of 
appearance before the CCMA for the purposes of arbitration. The party to the 
proceedings has, in addition, the opportunity to other representation as 
contemplated in section 135(4). It is evident from the abovementioned two 
sections, that the legislature did not intend to extent the right to legal 
representation to conciliation proceedings, where legal representation is barred.       
 
Section 140(1) of the Labour Relations Act 12 of 2002 reads: 
 
Special provisions for arbitrations about dismissals for reasons related to 
conduct or capacity 
 
(1) If the dispute being arbitrated is about the fairness of a dismissal and a 
party has alleged that the reason for the dismissal relates to the 
employee’s conduct or capacity, the parties, despite section 138(4), are 
not entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in the arbitration 
proceedings, unless- 
 
(a) the commissioner and all the other parties consent; or 
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(b) the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a 
party deal with the dispute without legal representation, after 
considering: 
(i) the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; 
(ii) the complexity of the dispute; 
(iii) the public interest; and 
(iv)  the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their 
representatives to deal wi th the arbitration of the 
dispute. 
 
Before considering the substance of the section, it is important to clarify who the 
LRA recognizes as a legal practitioner. 
 
A legal practitioner is defined in section 213 of the LRA as “any person admitted 
to practice as an advocate or an attorney in the Republic”. Automatically 
excluded are those persons who hold a law degree but are not admitted, as well 
as candidate attorneys who are only admitted after serving their two years of 
articles and successfully negotiating the admission exam.  
 
The relevant provisions in section 140 may be analysed as follows: 
 
140(1): “If the dispute being arbitrated is about the fairness of a 
dismissal………..” 
 
As previously mentioned, legal practitioners do not have a right to appear at 
conciliation proceedings; and the provisions of this section refer only to 
arbitrations, where, in terms of section 138(4), legal practitioners do have a right 
of appearance. Section 138(4) can therefore be regarded as the default 
provisions, subsequently modified by section 140, where applicable. 
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For the provisions of section 140 to apply, the arbitration must be about or relate 
to the fairness or otherwise of a dismissal. “Dismissal” is defined by section 213 
as meaning ‘dismissal as defined in section 186’, which is in turn restricted to 
terminations with or without notice13, refusal or failure to renew a fixed term 
contract either at all or on its original terms14, maternity dismissals15, selected re-
employment and constructive dismissal. Any dismissals falling outside the 
restrictive categories imposed by section 186, are not effected by section 140, 
and representation at these disputes are accordingly governed by section 138(4). 
 
Therefore, where parties are involved in a dispute that would normally be 
adjudicated by the labour court, but in terms of section 141(1) the parties have 
agreed to have the matter arbitrated by the CCMA, legal practitioners would be 
entitled to appear at the CCMA arbitration as of right. This view is supported by 
section 141(2), which holds that the arbitration proceedings contemplated by 
section 141(1) must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of sections 
136, 137 and 138. 
 
140(1): “the reason for dismissal relates to conduct or capacity……” 
 
Unfortunately, neither “conduct” nor “capacity” is defined by LRA. In the context 
of the section, one assumes that the section is referring to dismissals for 
misconduct and incapacity. 
 
Accordingly, the limiting parameters of section 186 are further limited, as section 
186(b), (d), and (e) and probably (c) do not involve either incapacity or 
misconduct, and therefore the provisions of section 140 only relate to dismissals 
where the employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without 
notice. It might seem somewhat curious that the extent of section 140 is limited to 
one category of dismissal, until one considers that the vast majority of dismissal 
                                                
13 Section 186(a). 
14 Section 186(b). 
15 Section 186(d). 
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disputes are covered by section 186(a), which is in effect a catch-all provision, as 
clearly most dismissals involve the termination of the employment contract by the 
employer. It is the reason for the employer’s action that further categorises the 
dispute as being one of dismissal for misconduct or incapacity and therefore 
subject to the provisions of section 140. 
 
140(1): “the commissioner and all the other parties consent…….” 
 
Even in instances where both the parties are legally represented the 
commissioner has the right to ask to be convinced that legal representation is 
necessary. This is in contrast to the Labour Relations Act, 1956 where the 
industrial court was not empowered to exclude legal practitioners where both 
parties agreed on legal representation. 
 
It would take a brave commissioner to ask the legal representatives of both 
parties to leave the arbitration but this could occur if the commissioner was of the 
justified view, for example, that the legal arguments of the representatives were 
obfuscating a relatively simple dispute, or where he sees an opportunity to settle 
the matter before the litigation commences and costs escalate. The 
abovementioned approach was endorsed in Ndlovu v Mullins NO & Another16 
when considering section 140(1): 
 
The subsection upon which the commissioner purports to rely requires the 
commissioner and each of the other parties to consent to legal representation 
on behalf of one or more parties to the arbitration proceedings. It is not 
sufficient for the parties to consent. Even if both parties consent by their 
conduct indicated unequivocally that they consented to legal representation 
on behalf of one or both of them it remains incumbent on the commissioner 
hearing the matter to independently exercise a discretion as to whether or not 
her consent should in the circumstances be given. 
 
                                                
16 (1996) 12 ILJ 654 (LC). 
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The court held in Colyer v Essack NO & Other17 that the consent, which entitles a 
party to be represented by a legal practitioner, is a discretion to be exercised by 
the commissioner who is duty bound to do so judicially. The section (140(1)(a)) 
does not give a commissioner the right to act on a mere whim when consenting 
to legal representation. Likewise, the court held, the withdrawal of the right to 
legal representation thus obtained cannot take place at the mere whim of the 
commissioner. The court held that section 140(1)(a) is clearly not intended to 
deal with the position where the commissioner exercises his or her discretion at 
the request of a party. It is meant to deal with the position where all parties 
before the arbitration want legal representation and the commissioner is then 
placed in a position to, nevertheless, to not to allow legal representation by 
withholding his or her consent. Such refusal should also be considered as a 
judicial discretion, which must be properly exercised, taking into account the 
factors listed in sections 140(1)(b)(i) to (vi). In this case it was established during 
the arbitration proceedings that the employee’s legal representative was in fact a 
candidate attorney, and not a legal representative as contemplated by the LRA. 
The commissioner subsequently excused the candidate attorney from the 
proceedings, and ruled that the proceedings continue without allowing the 
employee to approach and instruct another attorney to represent her. The court 
held that the commissioner acted grossly irregular in not considering the factors 
listed in sections 140 when refusing such representation.  
 
If, after excluding the legal representation for the arbitration proceedings, the 
commissioner fails to settle the matter, or if it becomes clear that the dispute is 
not as simple as it appeared originally, the commissioner could always be at 
liberty to invite the legal practitioners back to the proceedings.  
 
140(1)(b): “the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute” and “the 
complexity of the dispute, the public interest, and the comparative ability of the 
                                                
17 (1997) 18 ILJ 1381 (LC). 
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opposing parties or their representatives to deal with the arbitration of the 
dispute” 
 
The conjunction ‘and’ between paragraphs (iii) and (iv) suggests that a 
commissioner must consider all the factors mentioned in the four paragraphs, so 
that an application under this subsection should transverse them all. The 
commissioner need not be satisfied on each; it is enough that he or she comes to 
the required conclusion upon a consideration of them in their totality. (Malan v 
CCMA & Another 18). In Secunda Supermarket CC t/a Secunda Spar & Another v 
Dreyer NO & Other 19 the court held that where a party applies for legal 
representation in terms of section 140(1)(b), he must persuade the commissioner 
that he cannot reasonably deal with the dispute without legal representation. The 
commissioner must thereafter determine the question by reference to the factors 
referred to in the subsection. The last mentioned view was supported in Afrox Ltd 
v Laka & Others20. 
 
In summary, it is therefore clear that section 138(4), read with section 140 of the 
LRA, explicitly states who may appear or be represented in arbitration 
proceedings. A commissioner has no discretion to permit any person other than 
those listed in that section to appear or act as a representative even if the other 
parties have no objection. 
 
If a party to the dispute objects to the representation of another party to the 
dispute or the commissioner suspects that the representative of one of the 
parties to the dispute does not fall within the ambit of section 138, the 
commissioner must determine the dispute on whether to allow or exclude legal 
representation. 
 
                                                
18 1997 (9) BLLR 1173 (LC). 
19 1998 (10) BLLR 1062 (LC).  
20 1999 (20) ILJ 1732 (LC). 
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A dispute concerning the status of a representative in terms of section 138 is a 
factual dispute.21 The commissioner may call upon the representative whose 
status is being contested to demonstrate why he or she should be admitted as a 
representative in terms of section 138 of the LRA. The commissioner may 
request the production of documentation such as constitutions, payslips, the 
contract of employment, the prescribed from listing the directors of a company 
etc. Representatives should be prepared to tender evidence in support of their 
status.      
 
The LRA is silent on the right to legal representation at disciplinary proceedings, 
and reference has to be made to the South African common law to address this 
situation.              
 
2.2 THE LABOUR RELATIONS AMENDMENT ACT 12 OF 2002 
    
It is imperative to consider the implication of the repeal of sections 135(4), 138(4) 
and 140(1) of the LRA, by the provisions of the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act, 12 of 2002.(“LRA amendment Act”)  
 
The new Item 27 to Schedule 7 of the LRA amendment Act, a transitional 
arrangement, specifically states that the repealed provisions of the LRA will 
remain in force until such time as rules made by the CCMA in terms of section 
115(2A)(m) of the Act comes into force. Item 27 reads as follows: 
 
(27) Representation in conciliation and arbitration: 
 
(1) Until such time as rules made by Commission in terms of section 
115(2A)(m) of the Act comes into force- 
 
                                                
21 Landman and Van Niekerk; Practice in the Labour Courts 2001 . 
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(a) section 135(4), 138(4) and 140(1) of the Act remain in force as if 
they had not been repealed, and any reference in this item to 
those sections is a reference to those sections prior to 
amendment by this Amendment Act; 
(b) a bargaining council may be represented in arbitration 
proceedings in terms of section 33A of the Act by a person 
specified in section 138 (4) of the Act or by a designated agent 
or an official of the council; 
(c) the right of any party to be represented in proceedings in terms 
of section 191 of the Act must be determined by: 
(i) section 138 (4) read with section 140 (1) of the Act 
for disputes about a dismissal; and  
(ii) section 138 (4) of the Act for disputes about an 
unfair labour practice. 
(2) Despite sub-item 1 (a), section 138 (4) of the Act does not apply to an 
arbitration conducted in terms of section 188A of the Act. 
 
Rule 25 of the rules of the CCMA deals with objections in respect of a 
representative appearing before the Commission. The existence of this rule and 
the fact that it refers to objections against representatives appearing, clearly 
implies that there might be certain limitations to representation. The, rules 
however, fail to set out or specify the nature and extent of such limitations. 
Furthermore, Rule 25(3) appears to refer to categories of representation other 
than legal representation. In a ruling on legal representation by CCMA 
Commissioner Minnaar Niehaus, in case EC 3134-02, he refers to a footnote to 
Rule 25, which appears to be no more than a verbatim repetition of the repealed 
section 135(4), 138(4) and 140(1) of the LRA amendment Act. The commissioner 
raised the question as to whether it should be assumed that what the rules 
ostensibly attempt to achieve, by way of this rather awkward reference to the 
repealed provisions of the Act in a footnote, is in fact to revitalize the repealed 
provisions of the Act. 
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He further averred that there should be no logical basis for such interpretation, 
and more specifically for the following reasons: 
 
· Nowhere in the CCMA Rules is it stated that the repealed provisions of the 
LRA, remain in force. Reference is only made in the footnote in Rule 25 to 
sections 138(4) and 140(1) of the Act as they were prior to its repeal, as if 
these sections were still applicable, without any attempt to state that the 
intention is to incorporate these repealed provisions as substantive 
provisions in the CCMA rules. (The commissioner assumed that the only 
logical deduction to be made is that the footnote was only intended as a 
guidance or as a tool of re ference and that the reference to the repealed 
provisions of the LRA was in fact made in error). 
· By reincorporating the repealed provisions of the LRA, the CCMA most 
definitely did not give, as a creature of statute, effect to its mandate to 
regulate the issue of representation; 
· Conceptually, the notion of a prohibition against legal representation 
cannot be reconciled with the content of Rule 25 which deals with 
objections against representation. The structure of the repealed sections 
138(4) and 140(1) were such as to exclude legal representation unless 
certain criteria were met. Rule 25, on the other hand, clearly envisages 
that all types of representation be permitted unless certain circumstances 
are present. Incorporating the footnote as a substantive provision to Rule 
25 is inherently inconsistent with the structure of the remainder of Rule 25; 
and 
· Should it be assumed that the intention was to reincorporate the repealed 
provisions of the LRA, then one should at least expect consistence in 
approach throughout the Rules.  
 
The commissioner concluded that in lieu to the abovementioned circumstances 
he had little hesitation to reach the conclusion that the CCMA rules do not 
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exclude legal representation and to the extent that they might have attempted to 
do so, they clearly did not succeed. 
 
Item 27 to Schedule 7 of the Act 12 of 2002 states that “Until such time as rules 
made by the Commission in terms of section 115(2A)(m) of the Act come into 
force” the old provisions shall remain in tact.  
 
Section 115(2A)(m) refers to “all other matters incidental to performing the 
functions of the Commission”. 
 
Quite significantly, the draft contained in the original Bill on the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act, referred to section 115(2A)(k) which refers to the right of any 
person or category of persons to represent any party in any conciliation or 
arbitration proceedings. It appears from the abovementioned that the legislature 
opted for a generalized approach, to the effect that the transitional arrangement 
shall prevail until the CCMA had issued rules on all matters incidental to its 
functions. This may, according to Commissioner Niehaus include the issue in 
respect of legal representation. He stated that the CCMA had failed, or elected 
not to deal with the issue of legal representation in the recently published rules. 
This does not, however, detract from the fact that the resolutive condition 
contained in item 27 has been met.  
 
He furthermore believed that the repealed provision barring or restricting legal 
representation can no longer be regarded as having any effect and therefore 
legal representation should be permitted without any limitation.  
 
In his ruling commissioner Niehaus briefly discussed the implication of what he 
termed another (unintended) factor. The last mentioned may be summarized as 
follows: 
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The CCMA Rules have been published “in terms of section 115(6) of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995” and “in terms of section 115(2A) of the Act”. It was 
published as such on 25 July 2002 as Regulation 961 in Government Gazette No 
23611. 
 
It therefore appears that the reference to section 115(6) and 115(2A) are 
intended to respectively refer to the amended section 115(6) and the new section 
115(2A).  
 
However, the new section 115(6) states that: 
(a) A rule made under subsection (2)(CA) or (2A) must be published in the 
Government Gazette. The Commission will be responsible to ensure 
that the publication occurs. 
(b) A rule so made will not have any legal force or effect unless it has 
been so published. 
(c) A rule so made takes effect from the date of publication unless a later 
date is stipulated. 
 
In terms of the abovementioned section 115(6)C, the CCMA rules took effect 
from the date of publication, which was 25 July 2002. 
However, the amendments to the Act only came into operation on 1 August 2002 
as per the proclamation of the President of the Republic of South Africa 
contained in Regulation 61 of Government Gazette No 23611. The CCMA 
therefore issued rules in terms of the provisions of the Act, whilst those 
provisions were not operative as yet. Commissioner Niehaus was of the opinion 
that the effect of the above mentioned is that the rules issued by the CCMA on 
25 July 2002 are in toto of no legal effect in that it was issued in terms of a non-
existing statutory provision and therefore  null and void. 
 
He also stated that there was no compliance with the condition contained in Item 
27 of Schedule 7 to the LRA amendment Act and as such the transitional
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arrangement would remain in tact until the CCMA properly published Rules in 
accordance with the Act.  
 
Despite the above mentioned the Commissioner concluded that he did not 
believe that a CCMA commissioner can competently declare the CCMA rules null 
and void, and that it rather fell within the powers and function of the labour court 
to do so.  
 
In his ruling the commissioner held that: 
 
· On the basis of assuming that the CCMA Rules published on 25 July 2002 
in Government Gazette 23611 were competently published and as such 
were legally operative., it followed that the resolutive condition contained 
in Item 27 of Schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (as 
amended) had been met, and that as a result the provisions of the 
repealed sections 135(4), 138(4) and 140(1) were no longer in force by 
virtue of the transitional arrangements.   
· As a result the Applicant was entitled to be legally represented.    
  
 
3. COMMON LAW POSITION 
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 
 
As a general rule, the common law affords a party a fair opportunity to present 
his or her case (audi alteram partem  principle). This raises the question whether 
the right to legal representation may be included within the framework of the audi 
alteram partem principle, and therefore inherent to the rules of natural justice. 
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Probably the leading case in our law on legal representation before an 
administrative tribunal is Dabner v SA Railways and Harbours22. The point at 
issue was whether Dabner, an employee of the railway administration, against 
whom a charge of misconduct had been formulated, was entitled to be legally 
represented at an internal statutory enquiry that followed. The appeal court, per 
Innes JA with the full bench concurring, held that a person before such an 
enquiry was not entitled to legal representation. A large portion of the ratio of its 
decision is to be found in the following passage: 
 
Now clearly the statutory board with which we are concerned is not a 
judicial tribunal. Authorities and arguments, therefore, with regard to legal 
representation before courts of law are beside the mark, and there is no 
need to discuss them. For this is not a court of law, nor is this enquiry a 
judicial enquiry. True, the board must hear witnesses and record their 
evidence, but it cannot compel them to attend, nor can it force them to be 
sworn; and, most important of all, it has no power to make any order. It 
reports it finding, with the evidence, to an outside official, and he considers 
both and gives his decision. Nor can it properly be said that there are two 
parties to the proceedings. The charge is formulated by an officer who is 
no party to the enquiry. The board is a domestic tribunal constituted by 
statute to investigate a matter affecting the relations of employer and 
employee. And the fact that the enquiry may be concerned with 
misconduct so serious as to involve criminal consequences cannot 
change its real character. 
  
On almost every issue raised by Innes CJ as a justification for not permitting 
legal representation as of right, the situation differs from that pertaining in the 
case of an arbitration conducted by the CCMA. Hence under such an arbitration: 
 
· There are two parties to the proceedings; 
· The parties and/or other persons may be compelled as witnesses to attend 
the arbitration; 
· The witnesses may be forced to be sworn; and  
· The commission has the power to make an order, which shall be final and 
binding. 
                                                
22 1920 AD 583. 
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It is also easy to conceive of the situation in an arbitration (concerned, for 
example, with a simple dismissal of theft) where a party, having been compelled 
by a commissioner to adduce evidence under oath, proceeds to incriminate 
himself, thereby adducing evidence which may be utilized against him at a 
subsequent criminal trial. 
 
In Morali v President of the Industrial Court23, the question was discussed as to 
whether the discretion to allow or to refuse legal representation has been taken 
away by the provisions of section 45(9)(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 195624. 
An analyses of the clear, lucid and plain language of the subsection shows that 
the discretion vested in the industrial court to permit or refuse legal 
representation to a party in dispute before it, has indeed in specific 
circumstances been taken away and that such party is entitled as of right to 
representation, that is if no party objects thereto. And the subsection goes no 
further than that. It does not strip the industrial court of the discretion to permit a 
party to be represented even if the opposing party objects; it only deprives him of 
his right to demand representation. The court further held that (i) this view does 
not detract from the meaning to be extracted from the language of the 
subsection, (ii) is consistent with the common law, (iii) goes no further than is 
necessary in limiting or prescribing an existing power, that is, to exercise 
discretion. 
       
Baxler, in Administrative Law (1991) 555, noted that the right to legal 
representation is not an essential feature of the audi alteram partem- principle, 
but points out that the flexibility of the rules of natural justice accommodates legal 
representation, but only under certain circumstances. 
 
These circumstances include: 
                                                
23 1986(7)ILJ 690 C. 
24 Act 28 of 1956. 
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· disputes of a complex nature, 
·  the demands of public policy within the context of natural justice and 
equity, 
· cases involving a conferred right to legal representation in contract, 
· the express or implicit incorporation of the rules of natural justice, as well 
as 
· the intention of the parties as contemplated from the wording of the 
contract. 
 
In Morali v President of the Industrial Court 25, the court held that the mere fact 
that a rule is contrary to natural justice does not necessarily make it contrary to 
good morals and therefore void. 
 
In Ibhayi City Council v Yantolo26, Zietsman AJP opined that there was: 
 
No rule of natural justice, or rule of practice in labour matters, that 
determines that the word “representation”, where it is not qualified, must 
be interpreted to mean lay representation only. There is certainly, in my 
opinion, no reason to so restrict the meaning of the word as it is used in 
the staff regulations. 
 
The court, however, pointed out that where regulations provide that only lay 
representation, and not legal representation, will be allowed, then such 
regulations will be valid. Zietsman AJP summarized the authority on the right to 
legal representation into two categories, namely: 
· Where no specific right to representation before a tribunal is given in the 
statute or regulation governing the proceedings of that tribunal, no 
representation need be allowed; and 
· Where the relevant statute or regulation do allow representation, such 
representation can be limited by the terms of the statute or regulation to 
                                                
25 Note 23 supra. 
26 1991(12) ILJ 1005 (E). 
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exclude, for example, representation by an attorney, or the statute can 
state specifically that representation by an attorney will be allowed. 
 
Zietsman continues in stating that there is no rule of natural justice that requires 
that representation be followed. An exception to this rule may apply where it 
appears that because of the complexity of the issues to be determined, a person 
who can be adversely affected by the findings of the tribunal cannot be said to 
have been given a fair hearing or a fair opportunity to present his case if he has 
been deemed some form of representation. This case is certainly not authority for 
the proposition that legal representation may be permitted at all proceedings 
including those with which we are concerned here.   
 
In Lace v Diack and Others27, the court held that there is certainly no absolute 
right to legal representation in our law, but where an employee faces the threat of 
a serious sanction, such as dismissal, it may, in the circumstances, be advisable 
that he be permitted the representative of his choice. The disciplinary procedure 
usually provides for representation by an employee or shop steward. 
 
The court held that our law has not developed to the point where the right to legal 
representation should be regarded as a fundamental right required by the 
demands of natural justice and equity. In this case the employee faced charges 
of attempted fraud, the using of abusive language to a paymistress and acting 
aggressively towards a security guard. The court held that it had not been 
persuaded that the appeal hearing involving such complex and difficult issues 
that legal representation should have been permitted for a fair hearing to take 
place. Consequently this ground of review against the outcome of the disciplinary 
hearing failed. 
 
Insofar as these judgments have focused on the nature of the enquiry as being a 
decisive factor, it would appear that they are reconcilable. However, it is 
                                                
27 1992 (13) ILJ 860 (W). 
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interesting to note that the view of the court in the McNellie v Lamprecht and 
Nissan SA (Pty) Ltd judgment28, i.e. that an enquiry relating to charges involving 
fraud, involved such complex issues that legal representation became necessary 
for a fair hearing, was not followed in Lace v Diack and Others29, which involved 
similar charges.  
 
In the arbitration award of CCMA commissioner Hambidge, in SACCAWU v Citi 
Kem 30, she addressed, in general, the employee’s right to be represented at 
internal disciplinary enquiries. She identified the right of employees to be 
represented in one way or another at such proceedings as one of the 
requirements of a fair hearing. This right, according to her, does not necessarily 
imply actual or physical representation, but at least to be made aware and 
afforded an opportunity to be represented. She continues by stating that in 
instances where employees request representation and the representative is not 
available, it is advisable to postpone the hearing until a representative is 
available. She concludes her findings on representation by stating that the mere 
fact that the charges relates to serious offences would have convinced her to 
insist on employees being represented by either a co-employee or a trade union 
representative. Hambidge, unfortunately did not address or discuss the 
entitlement of representation by a legal representative, as it was not necessary 
on the merits of the case.   
 
In Yates v University of Bophuthatswana and Others31 the court held the view 
that apart from a recognition of the right to legal representation, what is generally 
accepted as an essential aspect of cases before tribunals is the principle of a fair 
hearing. The celebrated principles of natural justice, according to the court, 
provide that persons who are likely to be affected by administrative action should 
be entitled and afforded a fair and impartial hearing before a decision to act is 
                                                
28 1994 (3) SA 665 (A). 
29 Note 27 supra. 
30 (1998) 2 BALR 160 (CCMA). 
31 1994 (3) SA 815. 
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taken. Further, that those principles are germane to almost all systems founded 
on the principles of the common law. (The basic requirements of a fair and 
impartial hearing are now enjoying almost universal recognition, and have 
become reliable aphorisms in the South African legal lexicon)32.  
 
In Yates , Friedman J held that it is to be welcomed that the principles of natural 
justice escalate with increasing strength. He remarked that these principles 
constitute the forthright values of “those fundamental principles of fairness which 
underlie and ought to underlie every civilized system of law”. Basically people 
have an instinctive reaction to what is fair and unfair. 
 
Baxter, Administrative law at 540, had the following views on the principles of 
natural justice: 
 
The principles of natural justice are considered to be so important that 
they are enforced by the courts as a matter of policy, irrespective of the 
merits of the particular case in question. Being fundamental principles of 
good administration the enforcement serves as a lesson for future 
administrative action. But more than that, and whatever the merits of any 
particular case, it is a denial of justice in itself for natural justice to be 
ignores. The policy of the courts was crisply stated by Lord Wright in 1943: 
 
“If the principles of natural justice are violated, in respect of any 
decision, it is, indeed, immaterial whether the same decision would 
have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the 
essential principles of justice. The decisions must be declared to be 
no decision.” 
  
The courts have therefore nearly always taken care to distinguish between the 
merits of a decision and the process by which it is reached. The former cannot 
justify a breach in the standards of the latter.  
 
Friedman J agrees with the above mentioned interpretation by Baxter and 
continues by focusing on the importance of procedural justice. According to the 
                                                
32 835 F-G. 
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judge it is imperative that a distinction be drawn between the merits of a decision 
and the process of reaching it. Even if the merits are unassailable, they cannot 
justify and infraction of the rules of procedure in which the principle of natural 
justice have been ignored or subverted.  
 
The judge concludes that justice presupposes that a party be afforded a fair and 
proper opportunity to present his or her case. The basic test of fairness also 
involves the absence of bias. Both parties must be given an equal opportunity to 
present their cases, and consequently “administrative action must not be vitiated, 
tainted or actuated” by bias. 
 
The rule against bias has also been stated by Lord Denning MR in Metropolitan 
Properties (FCG) Co Ltd v Lannon33 in which he stated the logical philosophical 
theory underlying it in the following words: 
 
Suffice it that reasonable people might think that he (was biased). The 
reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and justice 
is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking: “the Judge was 
biased”. 
 
In Lunt v University of Cape Town and Another34, Howie J held that the operation 
of contractual principles does not exclude the right to a hearing. In this view the 
sphere on contract is a major vehicle for the application of the rules of natural 
justice. According to him the reason for reading natural justice into contracts is to 
constrain the exercise of powers that arise from contracts in exactly the same 
way as it is read into statutes to constrain the exercise of certain statutory 
powers.                               
           
In McNellie v Lamprecht and Nissan SA (Pty) Ltd35, the Transvaal Provincial 
Division had to decide whether the right to be represented by a person of his 
                                                
33 (1969) 1 QB 577 (CA). 
34 1989 (2) SA 438C. 
35 Unreported Case 396/92. 
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choice from his working area, which was conferred on the Applicant in terms of 
the disciplinary guidelines of his employment contract, included the right to be 
legally represented. 
 
In the case, the charges facing the Applicant at the disciplinary hearing were: 
· Fraudulent action as a result of changing expensive radios with cheaper 
radios; 
· Possession of company property without authorization;  
· Non compliance with company procedures; and 
· Misuse of position of trust. 
 
The court held that the Applicant was entitled to legal representation and in so 
doing, took into account the following factors: 
 
· The serious charges facing the Applicant, who ran a considerable risk of 
being dismissed (surely by virtue of facing a formal disciplinary hearing, 
anyone runs the risk of dismissal), and  
· The nature of the enq uiry, and more specifically the presentation of 
evidence and documents on behalf of the complainant, the fact that the 
Applicant had a right to cross-examine the complainant’s witnesses, and 
that evidence had then to be presented on behalf of the Applicant  and 
arguments addressed. 
 
The court concluded that the nature of the enquiry suggested a type of quasi-
judicial proceeding which was far more than a mere informal enquiry as to casual 
breach of contract of employment. The serious nature of the charges, namely 
fraud, could not adequately be handled by a fellow workman, and in the court’s 
view legal representation should have been allowed. The court held that however 
informal the enquiry may have been, the rules of natural justice were violated and 
the Applicant was prejudiced thereby to the extent that a review should be 
allowed. 
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Quite apart from the specific words of the applicable rules, the context can also 
nuance the meaning ascribed to the word “representative”. In Lamprecht and 
Another v McNellie36, the court accepted as correct the view that the word 
representative, read within the context of Nissan’s guidelines for “Grievance and 
Disciplinary Handling”, did not refer to a legal representative. Where no general 
right to representation whatsoever is conferred by contract, a court will consider 
whether any such right is conferred in terms of any disciplinary code and, if so, 
then such code binds the parties contractually. The court accepted that the 
presence in the contract of this express provision for a particular form of 
representation or of any general right to representation, gives rise to the 
inference that no other right to representation was intended to be conferred upon 
the employee at such an enquiry. 
 
The employer’s guidelines for grievance and discipline handling had therefore 
provided for the right of the employee to choose his own representative. The 
employee alleged that the guidelines formed part of the terms and conditions of 
his employment and such guidelines had effectively guaranteed entitlement to 
legal representation.  
 
The court held that the guidelines did not envisage a contractual intent, in spite of 
the use of the word “right”. The “right” referred to the rights necessitated by the 
unfair labour practice concept contained in the LRA, namely the right to a fair 
hearing and not a contractual right. The court held further that there had never 
been an offer by the employer to the effect that legal representation would be 
allowed. The court noted that, in fact, the letter which had initiated the 
proceedings, informed the employee that he had the right to be represented by 
any person from his working area and consequently the contractual argument 
entitling him to legal representation failed. 
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The court did not agree that the publication and implementation of the guidelines 
by the employer had created a legitimate expectation on the part of the 
employee. In considering whether the employee had a legitimate expectation to 
be entitled to legal representation, the court said that, objectively speaking, no 
such expectation arose. One reason was that the employer had never before 
permitted legal representation in disciplinary proceedings and secondly that a 
proper construction of the word “representative” led to a conclusion that a legal 
representative had hardly been contemplated. This flowed from the fact that the 
other people involved in the proceedings were all lay people.                   
 
In Dladla v Administrator, Natal37, the applicants were summoned to attend a 
hearing and were informed that they might each be assisted by an employee of 
the Provincial Administration (their employer). The attorney for the applicants 
was informed that he would neither be permitted to represent the applicants, nor 
be granted access to the venue of the hearing. The reason for the refusal to 
permit legal representation, a single and terse one, has been furnished in the 
affidavits submitted by the respondents (employer). It had nothing to do with the 
nature, scope or circumstances of the particular enquiries, which did not enter 
the reckoning. The employer simply relied, as one of the affidavits put it, on ‘a 
convention generally recognised’ that legal representation, rather than 
representation by another employee, was ‘not allowed in in-house disciplinary 
hearings of this nature’. The hearing continued in the absence of the legal 
representative, the applicants who relied on representation, were not allowed 
postponement of the proceedings to allow them to prepare their case, they were 
found guilty of misconduct and dismissed from their employment.   
 
The court referred to the judgment in Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v 
Zezile and Others 38, where it was held that the entitlement to legal representation 
at disciplinary proceedings had to be reviewed and conducted in conformity with 
                                                
37 1995(3) SA 769 (N). 
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the principles of natural justice and the audi alteram partem rule. The court 
refrained from expressing on the abovementioned because it was unnecessary 
considering the merits of the case.  
 
In Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v Zezile and Others39 the court 
contended that neither the Public Service Act40, not the Public Service Staff Code 
had forbidden legal representation on such occasions or established any scheme 
incompatible with it. Nothing had consequently precluded the official in charge of 
the disciplinary proceedings from permitting it. To allow legal representation, the 
court held, that it had discretion in allowing legal representation whenever it 
appeared in the circumstances appropriate to do so. They did not exercise their 
discretion, however, freely and fairly, according to the court. Instead they fettered 
it, treating the convention that they had invoked as a hard and fast rule and 
closing their minds as a result to the question whether, in the particular 
circumstances of the case, a deviation from the usual practice was an idea to be 
entertained.  
 
In Dladla v Administrator Natal41, Didcott J, referred to Pett v Greyhound Racing 
Association Ltd42, an English case about a licensed trainer of greyhounds who 
had been denied legal representation at a disciplinary enquiry into his conduct. 
Lord Denning MR had this to say43: 
 
Mr Pett is here facing a serious charge……..If he is found guilty, he may 
be suspended or his license may not be renewed. The charge concerns 
his reputation and his livelihood. On such an enquiry I think that he is 
entitled not only to appear by himself but also appoint an agent to act for 
him……… Once it is seen that a man has a right to appear by an agent, 
then I see no reason why that agent should not be a lawyer. It is not every 
man who has the ability to defend himself on his own. He cannot bring out 
the points in his own favour or the weaknesses in the other side. He may 
                                                
39 Note 38 supra. 
40 Act 71 of 1956. 
41 Note 37 supra. 
42 (1968) 2 All ER 545.  
43 (132 A -133A) (QB) 549 C-I (All ER).  
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be tongue-tied or nervous, confused or wanting his intelligence. He cannot 
examine or cross-examine witnesses. We see it every day. A magistrate 
says to a man: ‘You can ask any questions you like’; whereupon the man 
immediately starts to make a speech. If justice is to be done, he ought to 
have the help of someone to speak for him and who better than a lawyer 
who has been trained for the task? I should have thought, therefore, that 
when a man’s reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has to speak 
by his own mouth. He has the right to speak by council or 
solicitor……Natural justice then requires that he can be defended, if he 
wishes, by council or solicitor.                
 
The above mentioned remarks of Lord Denning have not been accepted in 
England, according to Lamprecht and Another v McNellie44, as authority for the 
proposition that legal representation must always be countenanced in situations 
of the sort with which he dealt. According to Didcott J, the Lamprecht and 
Another v McNellie judgment left open the question whether our law took the 
same general view of the discretion allowed in the state of affairs thus postulated. 
That it surely does so, is an answer for which support can be derived, however 
from Morali v President of the Industrial Court and Others45. In this matter 
Berman J declared at 133 C-D 
 
The common law……….provides, and it is indeed one of the cornerstones 
of the common law, that a party be afforded a fair opportunity to present 
his case, which is a facet of the audi alteram partem rule, so that whilst the 
party appearing before an administrative tribunal has no right to be 
represented, the tribunal has a discretion to permit this, ……..a discretion 
which it will exercise in appropriate cases, ……each case being dealt with 
on its particular merits. 
 
Didcott J holds that it seems that both Berman J and Lord Denning MR were 
correct in their treatment of the topic, and to conclude that no absolute right won 
recognition.           
   
During the course of the argument in court the applicants contended that where 
legal representation is neither allowed, nor prohibited by the applicable 
                                                
44 Note 36 supra. 
45 Note 23 supra. 
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legislation, that the permissibility or otherwise of such legal representation lay 
within the discretion of the tribunal whenever it appeared appropriate: the 
respondent, it was averred, fettered its discretion, treated the convention that no 
legal representation was permitted as an inflexible rule and closed its mind as to 
whether legal representation ought to have been allowed in the circumstances. 
Under the circumstances where no absolute right to legal representation was 
recognized, Didcott J quoted with approval the views of Lord Denning MR over 
the exercise of discretion in Enderby Town Council Football Club v The Football 
Association Ltd46 : 
 
It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal……But I would emphasize 
that the discretion must be properly exercised. The tribunal must not fetter 
its discretion by rigid bonds. A Domestic tribunal is not at liberty to lay 
down an absolute rule: “We will never allow one to have a lawyer to 
appear for him”. The tribunal must be ready in a proper case, to allow it. 
That applies to anyone in authority who is entrusted with a discretion. He 
must not fetter his discretion by making an absolute rule from which he will 
never depart.    
 
In casu, Didcott J concluded that the failure to have allowed the applicants legal 
representation amounted to a failure to have exercised a proper discretion and 
set aside the dismissals of the applicants.  
 
In Cuppan v Cape Display Chain Services 47, the right to legal representation 
depended upon whether a clause in a disciplinary code, which provided for 
“representation by a constituency shop steward at any disciplinary hearing”, 
constituted a binding contractual term between the parties. The disciplinary code 
also provided that disciplinary enquiries would be held “in accordance with 
natural justice and in terms of this agreement”. In concluding that the code 
formed part of the contract between the parties, Page J noted that a particular 
form of representation was intended to be conferred upon the applicant. The 
                                                
46 Note 2 supra. 
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learned judge further focused on whether these provisions confer on the 
applicant the right to be legally represented at disciplinary hearings. He held that: 
 
as emerges from the evidence cited earlier in this judgment, the 
contemplated enquiry in the present case is a relatively simple one and 
would not fall within this exception (that is that the flexibility of natural 
justice would appear to accommodate legal representation in unusually 
complex cases involving complicated evidence or legal issues). 
 
It therefore follows that the mere inclusion in the disciplinary procedure of a 
recognition of the principles of natural justice does not give rise to a right on the 
part of the applicant to be legally represented at the enquiry, and that the right 
would have to be specifically conferred upon him by the terms of the contract. 
 
Wiechers, Administrative Law (1985) 211, poses the question that if the subject 
matter of an administrative procedure is of a highly technical nature and involves 
complicated legal aspects, can it be said that if legal representation is refused at 
for instance a disciplinary hearing, that an opportunity to state his case has been 
given to the subject? Baxter, Administrative Law (1984) 251, too interprets the 
legal position as that there is no right to legal representation before a tribunal 
under the principles of natural justice. Similarly to Wiechers, he indicated that in 
unusually complex cases involving complicated legal issues, legal representation 
might be regarded as a sine qua non of a fair hearing.  
 
In Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa48 the applicant, who had been employed 
by the respondent and its predecessor as a distribution supervisor for some 
fifteen years, had been given written notice to attend a disciplinary hearing 
concerning a charge against him of alleged complicity in the unauthorized 
removal of company property. The notice reminded him that he had the right to 
be represented at the hearing and that he could nominate a work colleague as 
his representative. The applicant attended the hearing accompanied by his 
attorney, but was informed that he would not be entitled to legal representation, 
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whereupon he applied to a local division of the court for an order granting him 
leave to be legally represented by a legal practitioner of his choice at the 
disciplinary hearing and that the hearing be stayed pending the granting of the 
order. The letter of appointment under which the applicant was employed, 
headed “New contract of employment”, recited the terms of his employment and 
in paragraph 10 stated that the applicant would be subject to and bound by the 
provisions of the company’s rules and regulations, which included the company’s 
disciplinary and grievance procedure. The respondent’s disciplinary code 
provided in the preamble thereto that its schedule of offences and likely 
disciplinary actions were to be used as guidelines only, and reserved to the 
company the right to amend the guidelines. Clause 2.6 of the section headed 
“Disciplinary Procedure” provided that the constituency shop steward , or 
alternatively shop steward, then at work nominated by the employee concerned 
was to be present at any disciplinary enquiry and might represent him or her. 
Clause 3.2 of the section dealing with dismissal provided that “the enquiry shall 
be held in accordance with natural justice and in terms of this agreement”. 
 
It was contended by the applicant before the local division that the contract 
between the parties incorporated the disciplinary code and procedure, which in 
turn stipulated that enquiries were to be held in accordance with natural justice, 
and in terms of the agreement and that this provision, properly construed, 
conferred on the applicant the right to legal representation at such an enquiry.                                  
 
It is evident from the above that there is an inconsistency in the South African 
common law with regard to the courts’ interpretation of the inclusion of the right 
to legal representation within the ambit of natural justice. There appears to be a 
general consensus that the application of fairness and natural justice may entail 
the recognition of legal representation at quasi- judicial and disciplinary 
proceedings, on condition that extraordinary circumstances, including the 
complexity of the merits and the seriousness of the sanction, exists. The courts 
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further recognizes the specific terms and conditions of the contract existing 
between the employer and employee.    
 
3.2 ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RIGHT TO LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION   
 
In light of the above discussion, we can identify the following arguments against 
admitting legal representation at administrative and quasi judicial proceedings: 
 
· Tribunals are regarded as being masters of their own procedure and the 
courts will not lightly interfere in the proper exercising of the discretion of 
such tribunals. 
· Proceedings before a tribunal ought not to be equated with proceedings 
before a court of law. 
· The practice and policy has developed that no legal representation is 
allowed in some enquiries as they are conducted informally, and by lay 
persons having no special knowledge of the law. 
· Legal representation should not be considered in cases not involving 
complex legal and factual issues. 
· Legal representation should not be allowed in cases where the employee 
does not run the risk of a serious infringement of his or her rights. 
· Representation (other than legal), often adds a more valuable contribution 
to first hand knowledge and relevant circumstantial considerations, 
ensuring equal, or even sometimes greater competence to a 
representative to defend the affected person. 
· In situations where there are relevant guidelines one could discern the 
overall intention that the enquiry was to become a domestic matter. 
· Situations where there were applicable regulations allowing an employer 
to restrict the choice of the representative, an employee is entitled to 
request assistance at an enquiry, and 
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· In situations where binding contractual terms were applicable, the party 
seeking legal representation had to show an intention that the rules of 
natural justice were to be incorporated into the contract and that the 
contract conferred the right.   
 
3.3 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF ALLOWING LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION 
 
The previous discussions also raised the following arguments in favour of legal 
representation: 
 
· Professional legal representation is best equipped to present someone on 
purely legal issues. 
· The dire consequences to the affected person, if found guilty, should allow 
for the right to representation of the affected person’s choice. 
· The lack of skill in such proceedings on the part of representatives other 
than legal representatives. 
· The need for legal representation for a proper presentation of a defense 
endorsed by the inadequate defenses proffered in most cases by lay 
persons fending for themselves. 
· The difference between protagonists: an ignorant, illiterate and inarticulate 
affected person against a well-trained, experienced and competent in-
house specialist, or in a situation where the applicant is a foreigner with no 
knowledge of local legal proceedings. 
 
It is submitted that any attempt to ascertain whether one category of the above 
argument outweighs the other would not merely be subjective, speculative and 
arbitrary with no regard to the nature of the dispute or the relationship between 
the parties, but would also negate justice between the disputants. The challenge 
lies in an inclusive and accommodatory approach which at once ensures that the
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procedures adopted by and before tribunals are not “over judicialised” and which 
also leaves the affected person with the belief that he or she has been given a 
fair opportunity to present the other side of the story. A possible formula will be 
one which will therefore preserve the independence and the integrity of tribunals 
(in terms of simplicity, speed, cost, informality, accessibility, expertise and 
flexibility); but which is simultaneously flexible enough to translate “fair 
opportunity to reply” within the context of the audi alteram partem principle into 
the most effective and adequate answer to allegations against the affected party. 
 
From an affected person’s perspective, this entitlement addresses to some 
extent the factors such as faith in the quality of the defense being proffered, as 
well as in the person making the representation on his or her behalf. It 
establishes a sustained belief that justice is being done and is being seen to be 
done and that irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings, faith in the 
procedure that she of he has been given a fair opportunity to present the other 
competently, adequately and effectively. From the view of the tribunal, it has both 
an equal entitlement to claim legal representation and to object to such 
representation under circumstances where it does not deem it appropriate.   
 
It may therefore be summarized that although the common law does not entitle a 
party before an administrative tribunal to legal representation as of right, it does 
provide that such a party be afforded a fair opportunity of presenting his or her 
case- an application of the audi alteram partem rule. 
 
4. EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT 108 OF 1996  
4.1 RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the country and any law or section of law  
inconsistent with the Constitution will be voidable to the extent of such  
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inconsistency49.  
 
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution provides for the compulsory recognition of 
the common law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
      
It is now settled law that, where a hearing takes place before a tribunal other than 
a court of law, there is no general right to legal representation- unless there is a 
contractual stipulation to the contrary (Lamprecht and Another v McNeillie50). 
However, in terms of section 25 of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 
(“Interim Constitution”) and section 35 of the Constitution, every detained person 
has the constitutional right to have access to, and to be represented by a legal 
practitioner. In at least two judgments of different divisions of the supreme court 
the question arose as to whether this implies a constitutional right to legal 
representation in the course of disciplinary proceedings. (Cuppan v Cape Display 
Chain Services51 and Myburgh v Voorsitter van die Scoemanpark 
Ontspanningklub Dissiplinere Verhoor en n Ander 52 ). 
 
In both cases the respective courts arrived at a similar conclusion. The said 
provision in the Bill of Rights essentially relates to persons who are accused of 
offences in courts of law. There was no indication in section 25 of the Interim 
Constitution or section 35 of the Constitution that the right to legal representation 
ought to extend to all internal disciplinary proceedings and it was unnecessary to 
adapt the common law in this regard. There was, therefore, no general right to 
legal representation inferred by the above mentioned sections of the South 
African Constitution.             
 
In Cuppan v Cape Display Supply Chain Services 53 the applicant submitted as an 
alternative to the common law position regarding the right to legal representation, 
                                                
49 Section 2 of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996. 
50 Note 36 supra. 
51 Note 47 supra. 
52 1995 (9) BCLR 1145 (O). 
53 Note 47 Supra. 
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that he was entitled to be represented by a legal representation of his choice at a 
disciplinary enquiry under the auspices of section 25(3)(e) of the Interim 
Constitution. The court did not spend much time on the submission, holding that 
section 25(3) was clearly concerned only with persons who were accused of 
offences in a court of law. Cachalia et al in his work, Fundamental Rights in the 
New Constitution54, explained that section 25 essentially has to do with 
procedural human rights which accrue to detained persons, convicted persons, 
arrested persons and accused persons. The court further investigated whether 
the contractual incorporation of the disciplinary code into the employee’s contract 
of employment implied a right to legal representation. This was found not to be 
the case, since the provision was merely made for a shop steward to be present 
at a hearing and to represent the employee concerned. 
 
In Hamata and Another v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary 
Committee and Others55 the court had to consider whether a person had a right 
to legal representation in terms of section 35(3) of the Constitution. In this case, 
the applicant, a third year student in journalism, and employed at the Peninsula 
Technicon, attended an internal disciplinary hearing accompanied by his 
attorney. When advised that his attorney would not be allowed to represent him 
at the hearing, the applicant withdrew, together with his attorney, and took no 
further part in the proceedings. The hearing was thereafter conducted in his 
absence, and after being found guilty of gross misconduct, the applicant was 
dismissed. The disciplinary code of the Technikon further allowed for a process 
of appeal. The rules afforded the applicant the right to appeal to the council 
disciplinary committee (“CDC”). He exercised his right by lodging a notice of 
appeal together with detailed written submissions in support thereof. The CDC 
met on 28 January 1999 and upheld the finding of the internal disciplinary 
committee (“IDC”). The applicant then lodged a further appeal to the Technikon’s 
council. The council considered the appeal on 17 March 1999 and formed the 
                                                
54 (1994) 36 Juta. 
55 2000 (4) SA 621 C. 
Effect of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 
  
  Page 43 
view that the CDC had not properly applied its mind to the matter. Consequently 
it upheld the appeal and remitted the matter to the CDC for reconsideration. 
 
Accordingly, a further meeting of the CDC was convened on 14 April 1999. The 
applicant attended the meeting. As on all previous occasions, he was 
accompanied by his attorney. Although rule 10.2.15 of the disciplinary code of 
the Technikon, which prescribes the procedures for an appeal to the CDC, is 
silent on the issue of legal representation, the CDC decided that the applicant 
could only be represented at the hearing of the appeal by a student or staff 
member of the Technikon and not by his attorney. When the applicant was 
advised of this decision, he and his attorney once again withdrew. The CDC 
again upheld the finding of the IDC that the applicant should be expelled and the 
applicant once again lodged a further appeal to the Technikon council.  
 
The council met and considered this appeal on 17 June 1999. On this occasion it 
upheld the finding that the applicant should be expelled. The applicant 
subsequently referred the matter to the High Court for review. At the hearings of 
the IDC and the CDC the applicant contended that he was entitled, as a matter of 
right, to be represented by his attorney. The attitude of the IDC was that, 
according to the provisions of rule 10.2.11(1)(viii), the applicant was not entitled 
to be represented by someone who was not a student or staff member of the 
Technican. The CDC decided that, although the rules of the Technikon do not 
specifically provide for legal representation before it, it was prepared to allow the 
applicant representation by a student or a staff member of the Technikon, but not 
by anyone else. 
 
On the papers before the court the applicant persisted in his contention that he 
was entitled to be represented by his own attorney before the IDC and the CDC. 
Based on this premise he sought relief which was twofold: Firstly, an order 
declaring that on a proper interpretation of the Technikon’s rules, including rule 
10.2.11(1)(viii), students are permitted to be represented by “outside 
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representatives” in matters such as the present before the IDC and the CDC. 
Alternatively, that rule 10.2.11(1)(vi ii) is unconstitutional. Secondly, an order that 
the decisions of the IDC and the CDC be set aside for failing to allow the 
applicant the legal representation by his attorney.  
 
In argument, Mr. Farlam for the applicant, did not contend that the right to be 
represented by a lawyer of one’s choice can be considered as a sine qua non for 
a procedurally fair administrative hearing in all circumstances. Whether legal 
representation is an essential requirement of a fair hearing, Farlam submitted, 
will depend on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, he 
contended, the refusal to allow the applicant to be represented by his attorney, 
who was present and had prepared submissions, rendered the proceedings 
before the IDC and the CDC unfair.  
 
In support of these contentions, Farlam submitted that in the case of disciplinary 
hearings by administrative tribunals, guidance should be obtained from the rights 
permitted to accused persons under section 35(3) of the Constitution. Thus, for 
example, his argument proceeded a person facing a disciplinary enquiry should 
have the right to: 
 
· be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it56; 
· have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense57;  
· be present when being tried58, and 
· choose and be represented by a legal practitioner and to be informed 
promptly of this right.59  
 
                                                
56 section 35(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
57 section 35(3)(b) of the Constitution. 
58 section 35(3)(e) of the Constitution. 
59 section 35(3)(f) of the Constitution. 
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Farlam also found support for his contentions in the judgment of Friedman JP 
Yates v Bophuthatswana and Others60, as well as in the following statements by 
Lord Denning MR in Pett v Greyhound Racing Association Ltd61: 
 
Now the point arises: has the trainer a right to be legally represented? The 
club objects to any legal representation. 
 
Council for the defendants says that the procedure is in the hands of the 
stewards. If they choose to say: “We will not hear lawyers”, that is for 
them, he says, and it is not for the courts to interfere. I cannot accept this 
contention. The plaintiff is here facing a serious charge. He is charged 
with either giving the dog drugs or with not exercising proper control over 
the dog so that someone else drugged it. If he is found guilty, he may be 
suspended or his license may not be renewed. The charge concerns his 
reputation and his livelihood. On such an enquiry, I think that he is entitled 
not only to appear by himself but also to appoint an agent to act for him. 
 
Once it is seen that a man has a right to appear by an agent, then I see no 
reason why that agent should not be a lawyer……I should have thought, 
therefore, that when a man’s reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not 
only has a right to speak his own mouth. He has also a right to speak by 
council or solicitor.  
 
As to Farlam’s argument, based on invoking the provisions of section 35(3) of the 
Constitution, Oosthuizen for the Technikon’s counter arg ument was that these 
constitutional provisions do not apply to administrative hearings.                                                   
 
The court held that the right as contemplated by section 35(3) only applies to 
accused persons at a criminal trial. That the right should not be extended to 
persons appearing at disciplinary hearings and/or before an administrative 
tribunal. If the framers of the Constitution wanted these provisions to apply to 
administrative hearings as well, there is no apparent reason why they could not 
have included this in section 33.  
 
                                                
60 Note 31 supra. 
61 (1968) 2 All ER 545. 
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The reasoning that transpires for the judgment of Lord Denning MR in the 
interlocutory appeal of Pett v Greyhound Racing Association Ltd62 was supported 
in principle by the Hlophe JP and Brand J in Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula 
Internal Disciplinary Committee63, where the courts holds “……unfortunately, the 
conclusion arrived at by the Master of the Rolls was shortly thereafter held not to 
represent English law at that time”. 
 
In the continuation of the Pett case, Lyell J found that the above quoted 
statements by Lord Denning MR, relied upon by Farlam, to have deviated from a 
decision of the Privy Council in University of Ceylon v Fernando64. The judgment 
of Lyell J, reported as Pett v Greyhound Association Ltd (No 2)65, is summarized 
as follows: 
 
The plaintiff did not have a right to be legally represented because in the 
absence of express requirements in the instrument conferring quasi-
judicial powers on a domestic tribunal, the tribunal was required only to 
comply with those elementary principles of fairness which must as a 
matter of necessary implication be treated as applicable in the exercise of 
those powers, that is, the principles of natural justice, and, in the present 
case, legal representation before the local stewards was not essential to a 
fair dispensation of justice. 
 
The fact that the decision of Lord Denning MR in the Pett case66 had been held 
not to represent English law was pointed out first by Cilliers AJ in Smith v 
Beleggende Outoriteit van Kommandement Noord- Transvaal van die SA 
Weermag67 and then again by Harms JA in Lamprecht and Another v McNellie68. 
 
                                                
62 Note 61 supra. 
63 Note 55 supra. 
64 1960 (1) All ER 631 (PC).  
65 1969 (2) All ER  221 (QB). 
66 Note 61 supra. 
67 1980 (3) SA 519(T). 
68 Note 36 supra. 
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As to the South African authority relied upon by Farlam, that is Yates v University 
of Bophuthatswana69, it appears accurate, according to Brand J that this 
judgment appears to support his (Farlam’s) submissions, but that it would appear 
that the judgment does not represent South African law. In Dabner v South 
African Railways and Harbours 70, it was contended on behalf of the appellant, a 
railway employee, that a provision in respondent’s regulations which prohibited a 
railway employee charged with serious misconduct from being legally 
represented at a disciplinary held into such charge, was ultra vires and thus 
invalid. The court, however, fo und that the provision was in fact intra vires  and 
valid. In the course of this judgment Innes CJ expressed himself as follows at 
598: 
 
No Roman Dutch authority was quoted as establishing the right to legal 
representation before tribunals other than courts of law, and I know of 
none. 
 
This dictum has since often been followed and applied in our courts. (Feinstein 
and Another v Taylor and Others71  and Meyer v Law Society, Transvaal72). 
 
Hlophe J and Brand J agreed to the above mentioned authorities, and with the 
following statement of Page J in Cuppan v Cape Display Chain Services 73: 
 
It appears to be settled law that where a hearing takes place before a 
tribunal other than a court of law, there is no general right to legal 
representation, and where the relationship between the parties is 
governed by contract, the right of the person being subjected to an enquiry 
arising out of that contract to be legally represented at such enquiry must 
depend upon the terms if the contract itself.     
 
From this it follows that there is no basis for the declaratory order sought by the 
applicants in Hamata74, that the provisions of rule 10.2.11(1)(viii)- to the effect 
                                                
69 Note 31 supra. 
70 Note 5 supra. 
71 1961 (4) SA 554(W). 
72 1978(2) SA 209 (T). 
73 Note 47 supra. 
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that a student may be represented by another student or by a staff member of 
the Technikon at a hearing before the IDC- are to be interpreted as not excluding 
‘outside’ legal representation. There is also no basis for the alternative 
declaratory order that they seek, namely that rule 10.2.11(1)(viii) is invalid for 
being in conflict with the constitutional right to procedurally fair administrative 
action.  
 
Applicants’ further contention that, in the absence of any provision regarding 
representation before the CDC, the constitutional requirement of fair 
administrative procedure dictates that a student appearing before that body is 
entitled to legal representation, is equally without foundation.  
 
Farlam’s further submissions as to why the applicant was entitled to legal 
representation before the IDC and CDC was based on the following statement by 
Baxter’s Administrative Law75: 
 
Where oral hearings are granted, legal representation is not an essential 
requirement. In unusually complex cases involving complicated evidence 
or legal issues, legal representation might be regarded as a sine qua non 
of a fair hearing, and the flexibility of natural justice would seem to 
accommodate this. There a obviously advantages to be gained by legal 
representation in certain proceedings, but there is also much to be said for 
keeping lawyers out of the administrative process where the adjudicative 
process is not essential: lawyers and over-judicialisation tend to go hand 
in hand. 
 
On the basis of this statement Farlam contended that the IDC and the CDC erred 
in not allowing the applicant to be represented by his attorney. His argument in 
support of this contention was that, having regard to the fact that the proceedings 
involved a disciplinary hearing, the gravity of the charges, the severity of the 
possible sentence and the complexity of the constitutional issue involving the 
right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press, it was unfair to limit the 
                                                                                                                                            
74 Note 55 supra. 
75 (1984) at 555-6. 
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applicant’s choice of a representative to fellow students and to members of the 
Technikon staff. 
 
The court accepted Baxter’s76 exposition of the relevant legal principle relied 
upon by Farlam. However, the court disagreed that the application thereof to the 
facts in casu justifies the conclusion by Farlam. Although it must have been clear 
from the outset that the charges against the applicant were serious and that the 
consequences of a conviction were therefore also potentially serious, the court 
did not hold that such potential consequences were more serious than those 
involved in cases such as Dabner77 and Cuppan78, where legal representation 
was found not to be an essential element of a fair hearing before an 
administrative tribunal. Moreover, the court disagreed with Farlam’s submission 
that the factual, legal and constitutional issues involved were unduly complex.             
                                        
The court further held that where a relationship between parties is governed by 
contract, then the right to be legally represented at enquiries depended on the 
terms of the contract. The disciplinary code of the Technikon provided in rule 
10.2.11(1)(viii) that: 
 
The student may conduct his/her own defense or may be assited by any 
student or member of staff of the Technikon. Such representative shall 
voluntarily accept the task of representing the student. 
  
In unusually complex cases involving complicated evidence or legal issues, legal 
representation might be regarded as a sine qua non of a fair hearing and the 
flexibility of natural justice apparently accommodate this. The court found that 
there were obvious advantages to be gained by legal representation in certain 
proceedings, but there was also much to be said for keeping lawyers out of 
administrative process, to avoid over-justification of the process. According to the 
court the issues involved in this matter, namely the publication of an article with 
                                                
76 Note 75 Supra. 
77 Note 5 Supra. 
78 Note 47 Supra. 
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apparent false information, alleging various sex related practices at the campus 
of the Technikon and which were published by a journalist student, were not 
unduly complex. In fact, the applicants’ argument could well be an illustration of 
how a relatively simple enquiry might become ‘over-judicialised’. The court also 
held that where a hearing took place before a tribunal other than a court of law, 
there was no general right to legal representation. Where oral hearings were 
granted before a tribunal, legal representation was not an essential requirement.  
 
4.2 RIGHT TO FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
 
The court, in Hamata79 also considered the right to fair administrative action in 
reviewing whether a party may be entitled to legal representation during 
disciplinary proceedings. The right to administrative justice in terms of section 33 
of the Constitution Act (read with item 23(2)(b) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution 
reads that “administrative action which is justifiable in relation to reasons given 
for it”. ‘Justified’ in item 23(2)(b) means ‘able to be shown to be just, reasonable 
or correct’. The Constitution seeks to give expression to fundamental values of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness, but not purporting to give courts 
power to perform administrative functions themselves.    
 
The issue of entitlement to legal representation was again raised at the appeal  
of the Hamata judgment80 before a full bench at the court of appeal. In his 
judgment Marais JA holds that entitlement as of right to legal representation in 
arenas other than courts of law has long been a bone of contention. And further 
that the court a quo correctly observed, in Dabner v South African Railways and 
Harbours81, more than eighty years ago that the court categorically denied the 
existence of any such absolute right. South African courts have consistently 
accepted the correctness if that view. Marais JA is of the view that it is not 
entirely clear from the judgment in Yates v University of Bophuthatswana and 
                                                
79 Note 55 Supra. 
80 2000 (4) SA 621 (C).  
81 Note 5 supra. 
Effect of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 
  
  Page 51 
others82 whether the court was holding otherwise or whether its recognition of a 
legal representation in that case was grounded solely upon an implication arising 
from the terms of the conditions of service applicable to the applicant. If the 
former, the decision would have to be regarded as, with respect, an aberrant 
one. Marais JA held that counsel for the appellants laid no claim to any such 
general and absolute entitlement and declined to submit that legal 
representation, whenever sought, is a sine qua non to any procedurally fair 
hearing. The submission was less bold and infinitely less productive of the 
potential tyranny of  artful forensic footwork and heavy accompanying costs to 
which all major organizations, institutions, voluntary associations and individual 
might become exposed to, no matter how mundane the issue which arises. The 
submission was that in the particular circumstances of this case and, more 
specifically, the nature of the charges and the first appellant’s intended reliance 
upon constitutionally entrenched freedoms, fairness (according to Marais JA) 
required that he be allowed “outside” legal representation and that the IDC was 
vested with a discretion to allow such representation. 
 
Marais JA summarized the view of the IDC in that the rules prohibited it from 
exercising any such discretion.  He responded as follows: 
 
If it was right in so thinking, and because admission as student of Pentech 
entails a contractual submission to its rules, questions could arise as to 
the validity of such an absolute prohibition or the enforceability of any 
waiver (inherent in admission as a student) of even the right to have the 
IDC exercise a discretion in that regard. If it was wrong in so thinking, 
those questions would not arise.  
 
In dealing with the last mentioned issue, Marais AJ avers that there are only 
three conceivable objects which the rule may have been intended to achieve. 
They all conflict with one another to a greater or lesser degree. They are, 
whatever the nature of the charge and the possible consequences of it being 
upheld: 
                                                
82 Note 60 supra. 
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· To prohibit absolutely, any form of representation other than that for which 
provision is made in the rule; 
· To grant tacitly, an absolute right to be represented by a lawyer of one’s 
choice and to extend expressly the right to representation to encompass 
representation even by a non-lawyer, provided only that such non-lawyer 
is a student or a member of the staff of Pentech; or 
· To grant, an absolute right to representation by a student or member of 
staff of Pentech irrespective of whether such person is a lawyer; to deny 
an absolute right to representation by a lawyer of one’s choice if the latter 
is neither a student at, or a member of the staff of, Pentech; but to allow 
the IDC, in exercise of its discretion, to permit representation by such a 
lawyer. 
 
Marais JA is of the view that the correct choice from the above mentioned 
possibilities could only be made by applying the laid down principles of 
interpretation as well as the relevant protections as contained in the Bill of Rights. 
Marais JA refers to the applicable sections in the Bill of Rights and holds (in 
concurrence with numerous decisions referred to in this document), that the right 
to a fair trial and to legal representation at the trial is limited to an accused in 
criminal proceedings and should not be extended to administrative tribunals.  
 
He also refers to section 33 and item 23(2) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution, and 
holds that although these sections deal with administrative action, that the 
sections are silent on the issue of a right to legal representation.  
 
In national legislation83, as required by section 33(3) of the Constitution, to give 
effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair and to the right to be given written reasons where rights have 
been adversely affected by administrative action, there is an omission of the 
explicit recognition of a right to legal representation. 
                                                
83 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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Instead, section 3(2)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
recognizes and reaffirms what had long been axiomatic in the common law, 
namely, that “fair administrative procedures depends on the circumstances of 
each case”. Section 3 of the Act makes provision for legal representation only in 
a “serious or complex” case in which, “in order to give effect to the right to 
procedurally fair administrative action”, and administrator decides, in the exercise 
of a discretion, to grant an opportunity to obtain legal representation84.  
 
There appears to be a contrast between certain rights spelt out in section 3(2)(b) 
which “must” be given and the “opportunities” spelt out in section 3(3) which 
“may, in (the administrator’s) discretion, also be given. The opportunity of 
obtaining legal representation appears to be one of the latter. It is further clear 
than neither of these rights nor the opportunities is cast in stone. “If it is 
reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances” section 3(4)(a) allows an 
administrator to depart from them. 
 
Section 3(2)(b) provides that in order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair 
administrative action, and administrator must give a person “a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations”. These “representations” are not defined 
and may be a recognition of the audi alteram partem principle, and read in 
conjunction with subsection 3(a) which deals with legal representation in serious 
and complex cases, it may require the assistance of a legal practitioner to allow 
the employee to conduct his defense.  
 
Section 3(1) of the Act 3 of 2000 is clear in stating that administrative action 
which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any 
person must be procedurally fair. To promote or give effect to this general 
provision, the legislature allowed a discretionary power to the designated 
administrator to depart from any of the requirements referred to in subsection (2), 
if such a departure would be reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances. 
                                                
84 Section 3(3)(a) of Act 3 of 2000. 
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This may entail that the administrator in an administrative action may allow legal 
representation to promote reasonableness and fairness. 
 
The administrator may also be empowered to follow a procedure which is fair but 
different from the provisions of subsection (2)85 
 
Administrative action is defined in section 1 (b) of Act 3 of 2000 as the exercising 
of a public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering 
provision which has a direct, external legal effect, by a natural or juristic person 
or an organ of the state.  
 
Public includes any group or class of the public86.                       
 
Marais JA recognizes that with the passage of the years there has been a 
growing acceptance of the view that there will be cases in which legal 
representation may be essential for a procedurally fair administrative proceeding. 
In saying this, he emphasizes the most gene ral usage of the words 
“administrative proceeding” to include, inter alia quasi-judicial proceedings. He 
continues: 
 
Awareness of all this, no doubt accounts for the cautious and restrained 
manner in which the framers of the Constitution have dealt with the 
subject of legal representation in the context of administrative action. In 
short, there is no constitutional imperative regarding legal representation 
in administrative proceedings discernable, other than flexibility to allow for 
legal representation, but, even then, only the cases where it is truly 
required in order to attain procedural fairness.  
 
Marais JA holds that any rule purporting to compel such an organ to refuse legal 
representation, no matter what the circumstances might be, and even if they are 
such that a refusal might very well impair the fairness of the administrative 
proceeding, cannot pass muster in the range of issues which could conceivably 
                                                
85 Section 3(5) of Act 3 of 2000. 
86 Section 1 of Act 3 of 2000. 
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arise in disciplinary proceedings at Pentech. The consequences of the findings 
which could be made in such proceedings are such that there may be a need for 
the kind of flexibility to which Marais JA has alluded in this judgment.  Marais JA 
reiterates that the mere fact that administrative organs may be faced with the 
task of making decisions does not warrant the exclusion of legal representation. 
Legal representation should only be considered where decisions, considering all 
the relevant circumstances, cannot fairly be made without allowing legal 
representation. 
 
Marais JA reverts to both the pre- constitution common law as well as the 
relevant sections in the Constitution in accepting that proceedings of a 
disciplinary nature should be procedurally fair whether or not they can be 
characterized as administrative and whether or not an organ of State is involved. 
He continues by stating that if, in order to achieve such fairness in a particular 
case, legal representation may be necessary, a disciplinary body must be taken 
to have been intended to have the power to allow it to exercise its discretion 
unless it has plainly and unambiguously been deprived of any such discretion. If 
it has, the validity in law of the deprivation may arise but, according to Marais JA, 
no such deprivation exists in the rules of Pentech in the Hamata case. 
 
In conclusion the court of appeal in Hamata87 held that both the IDC and the 
CDC had a discretion to allow legal representation, but that they failed to 
exercise the mentioned discretion. 
 
 
 
4.3 RIGHT TO EQUALITY 
                                                   
Section 8(1) of the Constitution provides that every person shall have the right to 
equality before the law and to equal protection of the law. One may therefore 
                                                
87 Note 55 supra. 
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conclude in circumstances where one of the parties, albeit not legally qualified, is 
more experienced in labour law or is represented by a person more experienced 
in labour law (trade union representatives, although not always legally qualified, 
are often well-versed in this area of law and, as such, may well derive an unfair 
advantage in relation to more inexperienced opponents), the other party may 
have grounds for arguing that in the absence of legal representation his or her 
right to equality before the law has been infringed. 
 
As explained in Van Wyk equality is, according to Aristotle, a matter of treating 
like cases alike and unlike cases differently in proportion to their likeness or 
difference. Equality is not simply a matter of likeness. It is, equally, a matter of 
difference. That those who are different should be treated differently is as vital to 
equality as is the requirement that those who are like are treated alike. In certain 
cases it is the very essence of equality, according to Aristotle, to make 
distinctions between groups and individuals in order to accommodate their 
different needs and interests88. 
 
The interpretation of ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal protection of the law’ 
must give effect to the purposes of the Constitution and the values which support 
it. Hence it must take account of a history of inequality and oppression and the 
need for reparation and reconstruction. 
 
In this context, the minimum content of ’equality before the law’ is equality of 
process. The Canadian court said in R v Turpin89, equality before the law 
                                                
88 Van Wyk et al, Rights and Constitutionalism The new South African Legal Order (1994). 
89 (1989) 1 SCR 1296. 
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Is designed to advance the value that all persons be subject to the equal 
demands of the law and not suffer any greater disability in the substance 
and application of the law than others. This value has historically been 
associated with the requirements of the rule of law that all persons be 
subject to the law impartially applied and administered. 
 
Equality before the law requires, according to Chaskalson et al in Constitutional 
Law of South Africa, that each person is accorded equal concern and respect 
both in the formulation and the application of the law. It therefore  requires 
equality of representation on all law making bodies. It requires that the rules of 
law should in principle apply equally to all persons. It also requires executive 
organs of the state and administrative bodies to be even-handed in the 
enforcement and administration of the law, and the application of policy. 
 
The guarantee of equality entitles everybody, at the very least, to equal treatment 
by courts of law and administrative bodies. Equality before the law means, 
according to Chaskalson et al, that those who come before the courts of the land 
are assured of fair and impartial adjudication. 
 
Equal protection of the law embraces the substance and content of the law. It 
encompasses laws which afford benefits as well as laws which prohibit or 
regulate certain activities. It also opposes subordination and disadvantage in and 
through the law.                              
    
The essential characteristics of the adversarial system is that the onus rests on 
the litigant to advance his case for a decision to be made by a judicial officer who 
remains passive throughout the proceedings. 
          
5 CONCLUSION 
 
Given the powers entrusted to a commissioner at both arbitration and conciliation 
proceedings, it is submitted that it is not enough to rely on the common-law rule 
which permits a tribunal to exercise a discretion to allow legal representation in 
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situations where complex issues arise. Rather, such representation should be 
statutorily authorized in all proceedings, complex or simple, before the 
commission. Alternatively, and bearing in mind that the LRA grants parties the 
right to legal representation in situations where no other party objects, it is 
submitted that a similar provision be incorporated to allow for legal representation 
at all conciliation and arbitration proceedings. 
 
At the end of the day it is a question of policy; the legislature will have to weigh 
the disadvantages of prohibiting legal representation with the alleged advantages 
of cheap, non-legalistic and expeditious proceedings. It is submitted that, in all 
the circumstances, the disadvantages of non-representation outweigh the alleged 
benefits. There is a clear shift in the discretion of acting fairly. Acting fairly, 
represents a substantive change in the approach of the courts to applying 
principles of natural justice. Fairness, appears to promote a broader and more 
flexible concept than the traditional rules of natural justice. This offers the courts 
the opportunity to look behind procedural rights and consider whether the 
outcome was fair. 
 
The right to a hearing is one of the principles of natural justice. This may take a 
number of forms: the right to put one’s own side of a case; the right to be 
consulted; the right to make representations; the right to submit reasoned 
arguments rebutting any allegations etc. Why should there also not exist a right 
to legal representation as an integral part of the right to a hearing? Does fairness 
not make this imperative? In Balomanos v Jockey Club of South Africa90 
Claassen J declared: “In all these circumstances it would have been fair to have 
granted the applicant the advantage of legal assistance. The rules, however, in 
my opinion speak a different voice”. Has fairness, as expounded by 
Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 91 not made it possible for cases like 
Balomanos , to be decided differently?     
                                                
90 1959 (4) SA 381 (W). 
91 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 
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There may be administrative organs of such nature that the issues which come 
before them are so mundane and the consequences of their decisions for 
particular individuals so insignificant that a domestic rule prohibiting legal 
representation would neither be unconstitutional nor be required to be “read 
down” (if its language so permits) to allow for the exercising of a discretion in that 
regard. On the other hand, there may be administrative organs which are faced 
with issues, and whose decisions may entail consequences, which range from 
the relatively trivial to the most grave.  
 
One of the fundamental questions to be addressed is whether the recognition of 
a general entitlement to legal representation would impinge upon the practice 
that tribunals are masters of their own procedure and to what extent does this 
displace any discretion vested in the tribunal? 92 Recognition of this entitlement 
does not constitute too radical an infringement on the independence and integrity 
of the powers and the competence of a tribunal: on the contrary, according to 
Buirski, “it is arguable that this nuanced recognition may in the long run prove to 
be the most effective manner in which to dispose of these matters.” 
 
The above mentioned view may even be considered in co-existence with the 
practice that the affected party can choose to be represented by a person other 
than a legal representative. It would further be open for a tribunal to object to 
legal representation, on the grounds that the dispute does not concern complex 
matters of law and evidence. Buirski93 suggests that where a tribunal exercises 
its discretion and does not permit legal representation, the affected party can 
also approach a court for relief. The approach suggested here retains this 
practice of curial determination over the permissibility or not of legal 
representation. The fact that a court will have the last say on the question of legal 
representation will ensure that the interest of bodies like tribunals is protected. As 
                                                
92 Note 3 supra. 
93 Note 3 supra. 
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such, this does not amount to a surrendering of discretion but to a willingness to 
re-define and to re-interpret legal concepts and practices in tune with our reality. 
 
A further point of contention is the defining of right to legal representation within 
the context of the LRA. A legal representative is defined in section 213 of the 
LRA as “including any person admitted to practice as an advocate or an attorney 
in the Republic of South Africa.” Representation by a legal practitioner had been 
criticized for making the process legalistic and expensive. However, many 
medium and large organizations, including government departments and 
parastatals have in- house legal practitioners in their employ, and are 
represented at disciplinary and conciliation proceedings by these individuals. The 
last mentioned practitioners are in many instances individuals with legal degrees, 
and experienced as ex- practicing advocates or attorneys. Many of these 
individuals have completed post graduate qualifications in labour law. However, 
these individuals are exempted from the definition of a legal representative, and 
may represent the employer at the abovementioned proceedings. This once 
again raises the issue of equal protection by the law and reasonable and fair 
administrative action. Is it fair for a blue collar employee, uneducated in law, to 
present his case at a tribunal whilst being contested by an experienced legal and 
labour practitioner, where the ultimate sanction may entail the sanction of 
dismissal? The abovementioned, unbalanced status quo will prevail even if the 
merits or facts of the case are uncomplicated and less serious.  
 
On the same notion it makes little sense to exclude legal representation, but 
allow representation by a fellow employee or union representative in cases 
where the latter may be legally qualified, but not falling within the ambit of section 
213 of the LRA.                                                
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